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Abstract
Standard economic models with complete information predict a
positive, monotonic relationship between pay and performance. This
prediction does not always hold in experimental tests: offering a small
payment may result in lower performance than not offering any pay-
ment.
We test experimentally two main explanations that have been put
forward for this result: the ”incomplete contract” hypothesis views the
payment rule as a signal given to subjects on purpose of the activity.
The ”informed principal” hypothesis views it as a signal concerning
the characteristics of the agent or of the task. The incomplete contract
view appears to offer the best overall explanation for our results. We
also find that high-powered monetary incentives do not ”crowd out”
intrinsic motivation, but may elicit ”too much” effort when intrinsic
motivation is very high.
1 Introduction
Standard economic models tend to predict a positive, monotonic relationship
between monetary incentives and performance. This prediction seems to hold
in a number of real and experimental contexts - but not always. For example
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) found a nonmonotonic relationship between
the piece rate payment and performance on an IQ test. Performance when no
piece rate was offered was higher than with a small piece rate. Performance
did increase for sufficiently high piece rates.
∗Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI and GREMAQ), and CEPR.
†University of Minnesota.
‡We would like to thank Samuele Centorrino and Olivier Darmouni for excellent re-
search assistance.
1
Several possible explanations have been put forward for this result. Gneezy
and Rustichini favored an ”incomplete contract” interpretation. The pay-
ment rule (no payment, small payment or large payment) is perceived by
the subject as a signal that the experimenter sends on the purpose of the
activity. Participants received a fixed fee for participating in the experiment.
If no payment for performance in the task is offered, the signal is implicitly
stating that subjects have already been paid for the task, and to keep their
side of the bargain they are expected to perform as well as they can. If
instead some additional payment for performance is offered, this fact signals
that the purpose of the activity is earning money. In this case the amount
of payment is relevant to decide effort, in comparison perhaps with similar
activities. Different signals complete differently the initial contract.
Alternatively, the result has also been interpreted as evidence in support
of the Be´nabou and Tirole (2003) analysis of ”crowding-out” by monetary in-
centives. In their principal-agent model, the principal has better information
than the agent about the agent’s characteristics (his ability, for example), or
about the task’s characteristics: for example its difficulty, or how enjoyable
it would be. This fact is known to both principal and agent. The princi-
pal’s offer of a monetary reward for performance can then become a ”bad”
signal, increasing the likelihood of the negative characteristics: respectively
implying that the agent has low ability or that the task is very hard, or
boring.
These two different explanations for Gneezy and Rustichini’s result seem
plausible a priori, but they have quite different implications. We therefore
designed an experiment to shed light on the relative importance of the two
different explanations: the incomplete contract hypothesis, and the informed
principal hypothesis.
In the experiment, subjects take an IQ test consisting of 27 questions
from Raven’s Advanced Matrices (RAM) test. In the RAM test a subject is
presented with figures sharing a logical pattern, with one slot missing; the
task is to detect an abstract rule in the figures and choose the missing figure
in a set of feasible options. As in Gneezy and Rustichini, the experiment
has a first treatment in which there is no mention of a payment per correct
answer, a second treatment in which subjects are offered a very low payment
(one cent of a euro) per correct answer, and a third treatment in which they
are offered a high payment (one euro) per correct answer. In the first two
treatments, subjects are given a fairly generous participation fee (15 euros),
while no participation fee is given for the last treatment where the piece
rate is high. These treatments are meant to replicate the previous findings.
We expected performance to be higher in the first treatment and the third
treatment than in the second, and highest in the third treatment. To test the
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different explanations, we include a fourth treatment: subjects receive the
participation fee (15 euros) and they are asked to choose whether they wish
to receive, in addition, one cent per correct answer. Since they are choosing,
there is no ”bad” signal. A fifth treatment is added to test whether the
flat payment, that is the 15 euro participation fee, is necessary to induce
effort. In this treatment subjects do not receive any participation fee, and
are offered only one cent per correct answer.
Let us compare the predictions of the two theories. According to the
informed principal hypothesis, subjects who choose (rather than being given)
the low piece rate in the choice treatment should perform better than those
who are simply given the low piece rate by the experimenter, because they
have not received any outside signal about their skill in the task, the difficulty
of the task, or the effort cost. On the other hand they have a higher payment,
hence standard incentive theory predicts higher effort and performance than
without. According to the incomplete contract hypothesis there should be no
difference whether the low piece rate is chosen by the experimenter or the
subject. In both cases, the purpose of the task is earning money, and effort
on the task should be consistent with the piece rate. When participants
are asked to choose whether to receive a piece rate of one cent, and they
choose not to, they still may have inferred that the purpose of the activity is
earning money, and thus feel no sense of obligation to perform well. Thus the
incomplete contract hypothesis predicts that performance should be better
for subjects who are simply given the test without any mention of a payment
per correct answer than for subjects who decide not to accept the piece rate.
Our first main finding is that there is no significant difference in per-
formance (i.e. test score) across treatments. On average, subjects answer
correctly 18 questions out of 27 (19 in the treatment with the one euro piece
rate and the treatment where subjects choose the one cent piece rate, but the
difference is not statistically significant). Also in the fifth treatment, with no
participation fee, performance did not substantially fall: average performance
for this treatment was, yet again, just over 18 correct answers. These results
are striking: our participants seem to perform roughly as well when given
one euro for each correct answer as when they are given one cent, or nothing.
At first sight, this seems at odds with standard economic models and also
with the previous findings by Gneezy and Rustichini. It implies that for a
principal hiring our participants, the same performance costs 18 euros when
obtained through high-powered incentives, 15 euros when obtained through
a flat wage, and 18 cents when obtained through low-powered incentives.
What could explain the apparent insensitivity to monetary rewards? A
signal (either sent by an informed principal, or by an experimenter complet-
ing a contract) is effective only if the subject does not have a strong personal
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signal on his own attitude to the task. If subjects perceive the task as en-
joyable, interesting, or challenging, then they will be willing to provide the
highest possible level of effort even without monetary incentives. This may
explain the main result, and raises the next question: is effort responding to
different treatments? Although we cannot measure cognitive effort, we do
observe the time that each subject took to answer each question and complete
the test. Using test completion time as a rough proxy for effort, we can in-
vestigate whether this was also, like performance, essentially the same across
treatments. We find instead that there are two highly significant differences:
(i) effort is significantly higher in the treatment with the one euro piece
rate (relative to one cent or no piece rate, and 15 euro participation fee);
(ii) effort is significantly higher in the treatment with no participation fee
and one cent piece rate (relative to one cent or no piece rate, and 15 euro
participation fee).
The first result shows that monetary incentives do have a positive im-
pact on effort. However, this does not generate a corresponding increase in
performance. Thus effort may be ”too high” in the presence of monetary
incentives, as subjects take more time to think about their answers without
any appreciable gain in accuracy.
The second result is puzzling. A possible explanation, in the spirit of
the incomplete contract view discussed earlier, is that the monetary rewards
offered were so low (no participation fee, just one cent per correct answer)
that subjects believed this part of the ”contract” to be incomplete; i.e. they
expected additional monetary rewards to be offered in the course of the ex-
periment. In support of this interpretation, we note that our subjects volun-
teered to participate in the experiment knowing that experimental earnings
on average were roughly ten euros but could vary a great deal depending
on the experiment, the treatment, own behavior during the experiment and
other participants’ behavior. In this particular experiment, after taking the
test, participants were asked to guess how many correct answers they had
given, and the average number of correct answers in their session. In the
treatment with the one cent piece rate and no participation fee, they were
offered much higher payments for guessing correctly than in other treatments
(10 euros for each correct guess). Thus it is quite plausible that subjects in
this treatment, when taking the test, expected additional monetary rewards
to be offered later in the experiment, as was indeed the case, without know-
ing what they might be. If this is the correct interpretation, it suggests
that contractual incompleteness can be at least as effective as high-powered
incentives in eliciting effort.
When it comes to performance (score) on the test, the main lesson from
these findings appears to be not ”pay enough or don’t pay at all”, as in
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Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), but rather ”don’t pay too much”. We con-
jecture that the difference is due to the nature of the task and the setting
in which it was undertaken: in the experiment run by Gneezy and Rusti-
chini the questions came from a test that would have been quite familiar to
their student participants (a psychometric test used to scan applicants to
the university, similar to GMAT). In contrast, our experiment used a real
IQ test that was unfamiliar to our subjects. Moreover, participants in each
session took the test under identical conditions, and were aware of this. The
experiment therefore represented a unique opportunity for them to test their
IQ relative to their peers. This seems to have provided sufficient intrinsic
motivation for most of them, with little added benefit from high-powered
monetary incentives.
If this conjecture is correct, we would expect that if the same subjects
participated in a follow-up experiment, where they were asked to complete
another IQ test, and monetary rewards were made very salient to all par-
ticipants, then intrinsic motivation would be lower, and monetary incentives
might start to matter for performance. This is what we find in our second
experiment. Specifically, our results show that the piece rate has a significant
positive effect on performance in the new test, and that this overall effect is
due primarily to the positive impact of monetary incentives on the more tal-
ented participants. Moreover, our subjects behave as if they expected this:
when asked to behave as ”Principals” and set piece rates for their ”Agents”,
they offer significantly higher piece rates to the more talented individuals.
Our combined findings from the two experiments suggest that for tasks
requiring talent ”pay enough or don’t pay at all” applies in the following
way: ”don’t pay at all” when intrinsic motivation is sufficiently high, be-
cause monetary incentives in this case elicit too much effort and not enough
performance, but ”pay enough” when intrinsic motivation is insufficient to
motivate talented individuals.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
in detail the experimental design and procedures. Our results are presented
in section 3, and our conclusions in section 4.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
Our subjects were students at the University of Toulouse, and all the ex-
perimental sessions were carried out in the experimental laboratory of the
Toulouse School of Economics, using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).
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2.1 Tests
We employed two tests during the experiments. In the first experiment,
subjects were given 27 questions from Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices
(Series II). This is an IQ test: a subject is presented with figures sharing a
logical pattern, with one slot missing; the task is to detect an abstract rule
in the figures and choose the missing figure in a set of feasible options. An
example question is shown below. We refer to this test as Raven27 in what
follows. Participants were told, before starting the test, that they would
be given 27 questions from a Raven test, ”which is often used as a test of
intelligence quotient (IQ)”.
In the second experiment, subjects were given 12 questions from Raven’s
Advanced Progressive Matrices (the ones from series II that had not been
used previously, and questions from series I). We refer to this test as Raven12.
Participants were simply told they would be given 12 questions from another
Raven test, similar to the first one, but not the same.
Figure 1: An example of the questions used in the RAM task.
2.2 First Experiment: Design
Subjects were all given the same test (Raven27). For each question, they
could choose one of 8 possible answers, or blank. They had 66 seconds to
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reply (the time remaining was shown on their screens), then the question
disappeared and the following one appeared on their screen.
Participants were randomly assigned to five different conditions (treat-
ments), and were not aware of any condition except their own. Subjects in
any given experimental session all faced the same condition, and this was
made clear by reading out some of the instructions that also appeared on
each participant’s screen. The treatments were:
Treatment 1 : in this condition, subjects were told they would be paid 15
euros for their participation in the experiment. There was no mention of any
additional payment based on their performance in the test.
Treatment 2 : this condition differed from Treatment 1 in one respect:
subjects were told they would be paid, in addition to the 15 euro participation
fee, 1 cent for each correct answer in the test.
Treatment 3 : subjects in this condition were told they would be paid
one euro for each correct answer on the test. There was no mention of a
participation fee.
Treatment 4 : in this condition subjects were asked whether they wished
to receive, in addition to the 15 euro participation fee, 1 cent for each correct
answer.
Treatment 5 : subjects in this condition were told they would be paid
one cent for each correct answer on the test. There was no mention of any
participation fee.
Subjects in treatments with a participation fee and/or a piece rate were
told the relevant amounts before taking the test. In treatments without a
participation fee or a piece rate, these were simply not mentioned. This was
all the information concerning payments given to participants before they
took the test. After the test, all subjects were asked to guess their own
score, and the average score in their session (number of correct answers). In
all but one treatment they received one euro per correct guess, or three euros
for making both guesses correctly. The exception was Treatment 5: here,
since subjects were paid no participation fee and only a tiny piece rate on
the test (one cent), the payment for each correct guess was much higher (10
euros). This treatment therefore generated some very low earnings. On the
other hand, one third of subjects made at least one correct guess, and one
participant guessed both own and average score correctly. Subjects had been
told in advance (when deciding whether to volunteer for participation) that
remuneration would depend on their answers and on the answers given by
other participants in the experiment.
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2.3 Second Experiment: Design
Subjects in treatments 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the first experiment (i.e. the treat-
ments with zero or one cent piece rates, which nevertheless generated roughly
the same average performance as the treatment with the one euro piece rate)
were invited to participate in the second experiment. In each session of this
experiment, participants were randomly and anonymously assigned to groups
of three. Within a given group, each subject was the “Principal” with respect
to one of the other two subjects (his “Agent”), and the “Agent” with respect
to the other (his “Principal”). Roles were defined neutrally with letters A,
B and C.
The Principal-Agent game to be played was explained to all subjects as
follows. Each Agent would be given 12 questions from another Raven test
(similar to the one used in the first experiment, but not the same). Each
Principal would gain 1 euro per correct answer given by his Agent. Each
Principal would have to tell his Agent in advance (before the test) his piece
rate; that is, the amount that the Principal would pay his Agent for each
correct answer.
Principals were asked to choose the piece rates conditional on different
hypotheses about their Agent (i.e. using the strategy method). The ap-
plicable piece rate was then announced to the Agent before the test. The
hypotheses are listed in the Appendix: essentially they distinguish between
subjects that had participated in different treatments in the first experiment.
This made monetary rewards salient by making participants aware of the dif-
ferent treatments that had been used in the first experiment (except for the
one with the one euro piece rate). Importantly, for all but one treatment1
the hypotheses also distinguish between subjects who had scored above or
below 18, the average score. This enabled us to check whether subjects of-
fered different piece rates to agents depending on their performance in the
first experiment.
2.4 Experimental Procedures
Subjects were recruited by visiting the first or last 5 minutes of lectures
given to undergraduates and Master’s students in Economics, Business and
Finance, and Law, at the University of Toulouse 1. We informed students
that they could, if they wished, volunteer to participate in experiments on
decision-making in the Experimental Economics Laboratory of TSE (Toulouse
School of Economics), by registering on the Laboratory’s recruitment web-
1The exception was Treatment 4, where we distinguished instead between subjects who
chose to be paid the one cent piece rate and those who chose not to.
8
site. We told them that sessions could take up to 90 minutes, inclusive of
individual confidential payments at the end of the experiment. Payments
would depend on their decisions and those of other participants.
In total, 278 subjects participated in the first experiment. We invited
those who had attended sessions for treatments 1, 2, 4 and 5 to participate
in the second experiment. We organized a smaller number of sessions for the
second experiment, yielding a total of 81 subjects.
Table 1 describes participation in the different treatments of the first
experiment.
3 Results
3.1 First Experiment
All subjects in this experiment took an IQ test consisting of 27 questions
from Raven’s Advanced Matrices (”Raven27”). They all took the test under
the same time conditions (66 seconds per question). What differed across
treatments was the participation fee and the piece rate per correct answer,
as described in detail in section 2. Table 2 summarizes the resulting IQ test
scores (number of correct answers).
Our first main finding is that there are no significant differences in perfor-
mance across treatments, with pairwise Mann-Whitney tests failing to reject
the hypothesis that the data comes from the same population2. This finding
is confirmed by the results of a Tobit regression3 for the test score (number
of correct answers), reported in Table 3. None of the treatment dummies are
statistically significant. In fact, gender and age are the only statistically sig-
nificant effects. The negative coefficient for age may well reflect the presence
in the sample of some ”repeat” students among the undergraduates; that is,
undergraduates who failed their exams and had to retake the year4.
These results are quite striking: monetary rewards seem to have very
little impact on performance, with an average of 18 correct answers out of
2In treatment 4, only 7 out of 50 subjects chose not to receive the one cent piece rate.
The difference in performance between subjects who opted to receive the piece rate and
those who did not is insignificant (p = 0.102).
3We just allow for the possibility of censoring at zero, since there are no observations
with a full score (i.e. 27 correct answers).
4The French educational system allows students who fail to retake the year more than
once. Thus a small minority of undergraduates are significantly older than the average
undergraduate or Master’s student.
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Table 1: First Experiment: participation
Treatment Participants mean age % female % graduates
1 51 21 51 24
2 36 21 61 19
3 105 20 49 37
4 50 21 56 16
5 36 20 53 0
Table 2: First experiment: number of correct answers on Raven27
Test score Mean Observations
treatment1 18.04 51
treatment2 18.19 36
treatment 3 19.35 105
treatment4 one cent 18.77 43
treatment4 no cent 16.71 7
treatment 5 18.19 36
Pairwise MW tests p-value
treatment 1 versus 2 0.779
treatment 1 versus 3 0.133
treatment 2 versus 4 one cent: p=0.560
treatment 1 versus 5: p=0.976
Table 3: Tobit regression for IQ test score (Raven27)
Variable Coefficient p-value
treatment2 0.129 0.884
treatment3 0.948 0.181
treatment4 one cent 0.667 0.431
treatment4 no cent -1.097 0.507
treatment 5 0.049 0.956
female -0.966∗ 0.051
graduate 0.735 0.221
age -0.189∗∗ 0.050
Observations: 278
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27 when subjects are given no piece rate or a one cent piece rate, and 19
correct answers when they choose the one cent piece rate themselves or they
are given a one euro piece rate. Moreover, these small differences across
treatments are not statistically significant.
From the perspective of a ”Principal” hiring our participants as agents, it
would seem that the cost of obtaining a performance of 18 correct answers can
be as high as 18 euros if he provides high-powered incentives (one euro piece
rate, no participation fee) and as low as 18 cents if he provides low-powered
incentives (one cent piece rate, no participation fee).
What could explain the apparent insensitivity to monetary rewards? A
first conjecture might be that subjects’ effort on the task did not respond
to monetary incentives: for example, because the task was so enjoyable and
interesting that participants were willing to provide the highest possible level
of effort even without monetary incentives. Although we cannot measure
cognitive effort, we do observe the time that each subject took to answer
each question and complete the test. Using test completion time as a rough
proxy for effort, we can investigate whether this was also, like performance,
essentially the same across treatments.
To calculate completion times, we added the times taken to answer each
question. Some subjects occasionally reached the timeout of 66 seconds with-
out recording an answer (neither one of the suggested eight possible answers,
nor blank). For these questions, it seems reasonable to assume on average
that the subject was not paying attention (providing effort); we therefore
do not include the 66 seconds for that particular question in our measure of
completion time (effort). In some cases, it is possible that the timeout was
reached without doing anything because the subject was thinking hard about
the answer and could not decide until the end. We therefore repeated the
analysis excluding all the subjects who had reached the timeout on at least
one occasion during the test (24 in total, leaving us with 254 participants);
this yielded very similar results, reported in the Appendix.
Table 4 presents the main results for the full sample of 278 subjects. Un-
like performance (test scores), effort measured by test completion time does
vary significantly across treatments. Specifically, pairwise Mann-Whitney
tests reveal two significant differences relative to the treatment with par-
ticipation fee and no piece rate. First, effort is significantly higher in the
treatment with the high (one euro) piece rate. Second, effort is significantly
higher in the treatment with no participation fee and low piece rate (one cent).
We also estimated a tobit regression, including controls for age, gender
and educational status. The estimates are shown in table 5 and lend further
support to our finding: the coefficients on the dummy variables for the same
two treatments are large and positive, and highly significant.
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Table 4: First experiment: time to complete IQ test (Raven27)
Completion time Mean Observations
treatment1 990.14 51
treatment2 972.47 36
treatment 3 1089.87 105
treatment4 one cent 1012.33 43
treatment4 no cent 1002.86 7
treatment 5 1103.06 36
Pairwise MW tests p-value
treatment 1 versus 3 0.001∗∗∗
treatment 1 versus 5 0.002∗∗∗
treatment 2 versus 4 one cent: p=0.342
treatment 1 versus 2: p=0.856
Table 5: Tobit regression for IQ test completion time (Raven27)
Variable Coefficient p-value
treatment2 -7.163 0.885
treatment3 123.908∗∗∗ 0.002
treatment4 one cent 34.018 0.472
treatment4 no cent -22.936 0.803
treatment 5 124.892∗∗ 0.014
female -6.770 0.806
graduate -44.724 0.182
age 14.309∗∗∗ 0.008
Observations: 278
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These results shed some light on the insensitivity of performance to mon-
etary rewards found earlier. The first conjecture, that subjects’ effort was
largely unaffected by monetary incentives, does not seem consistent with the
data on test completion times. Offering a high piece rate (one euro) does
have a significant positive impact on effort. Surprisingly, so does the offer
of a tiny piece rate with no participation fee! A possible explanation for
this second finding is that the monetary rewards offered were so low in this
case that subjects believed this part of the ”contract” to be incomplete; i.e.
they expected additional monetary rewards to be offered in the course of
the experiment (as was the case), and these expectations were sufficiently
optimistic to elicit considerable effort.
However, significantly higher effort did not generate a corresponding in-
crease in performance. Thus high-powered monetary incentives (or optimistic
expectations) may elicit ”too much” effort, as subjects take more time to
think about their answers without any appreciable gain in accuracy. Why?
We conjecture that the explanation lies in the nature of the task and the
setting in which it was undertaken: our experiment used a real IQ test that
was unfamiliar to our subjects. Moreover, participants in each session took
the test under identical conditions, and were aware of this. The experiment
therefore represented a unique opportunity for them to test their IQ relative
to their peers. This appears to have provided sufficient intrinsic motiva-
tion for most of them, with little added benefit from high-powered monetary
incentives.
If this conjecture is correct, we would expect that if the same subjects
participated in a follow-up experiment, where they were asked to complete
another IQ test, and monetary rewards were made very salient to all par-
ticipants, then intrinsic motivation would be lower, and monetary incentives
might start to matter for performance. We explored this possibility in our
second experiment.
3.2 Second Experiment
All subjects in this experiment had previously participated in the first ex-
periment. In the second experiment they all took a new IQ test, consisting
of 12 new questions from Raven’s Advanced Matrices (Raven12).
The new experimental setting made monetary rewards particularly salient
for all participants. Subjects were randomly and anonymously assigned to
groups of three. Within each group, every subject played the role of ”Prin-
cipal” relative to one member of the group, and the role of ”Agent” relative
to the other group member. In his role as Principal, each participant was
told he would receive one euro per correct answer to the test given by his
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Agent; before the test, he was asked to specify the piece rate he would pay
his Agent. In his role as Agent, each participant was told before starting the
test the piece rate his Principal would pay him.
3.2.1 Performance on the IQ test
Our data from the test in the first experiment provides a rough proxy for an
individual’s talent (ability): the ratio of the number of correct answers to
the time taken to complete the test. This should be higher for more talented
individuals. The variable ”talent” is equal to this ratio multiplied by one
hundred. The variable ”effort” represents the time taken to complete the
new test (Raven12). The variable ”pay” is equal to the piece rate for the
individual taking the new test (known to him when he takes the test).
Our conjecture is that monetary incentives will have a significant impact
on performance in this setting, in contrast with the first experiment. We
therefore estimate tobit regressions for the test score (number of correct
answers to Raven12). The results are presented in table 6.
Column 1 shows that the piece rate has a highly significant positive effect
on performance, controlling for talent, which is consistent with our conjec-
ture. Column 2 reveals that this effect is due to the positive impact of the
piece rate on the performance of talented individuals. We also examine the
impact of effort on performance: as expected, column 3 shows that it is pos-
itive and highly significant, while column 4 makes clear that what matters is
the effort of talented individuals.
3.2.2 Principals’ offers
Our results on performance suggest that a Principal is likely to be better
off offering a higher piece rate to talented individuals, thereby achieving a
significant increase in performance, than to less talented individuals, which
would simply increase the Principal’s costs with little gain in performance.
Do our experimental subjects offer higher piece rates to their more talented
agents? We can easily check this, because piece rates were elicited using the
strategy method, giving us piece rate offers by each participant, contingent
on the agent’s previous performance. Table 7 summarizes average piece rate
offers contingent on the treatment the Agent had participated in and his
performance in the first experiment (IQ test score above or below average).
We find indeed that piece rate offers are higher for Agents who obtained
a score above average in the IQ test given to subjects in the first experiment
(Raven27). This is true across treatments, and the differences are statistically
significant (using the matched pairs Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxson test). No
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Table 6: Second experiment: Tobit regressions for IQ test score (Raven12)
1 2 3 4
Variable
pay 0.080∗∗∗ -0.062
(p-value) (0.002) (0.407)
talent -0.488 -0.941∗∗ 0.133 -1.865∗∗
(p-value) (0.215) (0.046) (0.762) (0.026)
female 0.608 0.509 0.861 0.546
(p-value) (0.433) (0.502) (0.262) (0.437)
age -0.248 -0.228 -0.313∗ -0.189
(p-value) (0.170) 0.198 (0.086) (0.262)
talent*pay 0.074∗∗
(p-value) (0.047)
effort 0.011∗∗∗ -0.005
(p-value) (0.003) (0.363)
talent*effort 0.010∗∗∗
(p-value) (0.000)
Dependent variable: Test score on Raven12 .
Score: number of correct answers.
Talent: (Score for Raven27/completion time)*100
Effort: completion time for Raven12
Pay: piece rate for Raven12
Observations: 81
other differences are significant.
4 Conclusions
We can now provide an overall interpretation of our results. In the first
experiment a very strong and clear signal given by the explicit statement
that the test ”is normally used as a test of IQ (intelligence quotient)” leaves
no ambiguity. Subjects acquire a strong belief on the purpose of the activity
- it is about testing intelligence, and this has considerable motivational force,
particularly in a setting where subjects are competing directly and visibly
with their peers, under identical conditions. The additional signal contained
in the payment rule then has only a secondary, less important impact. This
effect is still strong enough to affect the level of effort.
The situation is reversed in the second experiment, where the payment
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rule is made much more salient and becomes the strongest signal concerning
the purpose of the activity. The interpretation in terms of signals concerning
the purpose of the activity seems to offer a way of reconciling the results of
both experiments, which is appealing.
It can account for the fact that in the first experiment, although effort is
higher in the presence of high-powered monetary incentives, there is very little
difference in performance (test score): the strong explicit signal concerning
the purpose of the activity (testing intelligence) already provides sufficient
motivation, with little added benefit from monetary rewards.
The same logic helps to shed light on the other significant finding from
the first experiment: the higher effort by subjects in the treatment with no
participation fee and only a tiny (one cent) piece rate. One way of inter-
preting this is that the strong signal concerning the purpose of the activity
(testing intelligence) leads subjects to be optimistic about additional rewards
that may be offered during the course of the experiment, since proving one’s
intelligence is normally expected to be correlated with tangible rewards.
In the same light, we can also account for the greater pay-performance
sensitivity in the second experiment, where the setting sends a strong signal
that the purpose of the activity is now earning money.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Instructions for the first experiment
Welcome; you are about to participate in an economics experiment. Your
answers and decisions during this experiment will have no consequence for
your grades or your degree. This experiment studies decision-making. During
the experiment, you will be asked first of all to answer some questions from a
Raven test. This is a test that is often used to test IQ (intelligence quotient).
The experiment will last approximately 40 minutes. {In treatments with a
participation fee, the following sentence was included here: ”Each participant
will receive 15 euros for his participation.” In treatment 3, the following
sentence was included instead: ”Each participant will be remunerated for
each correct answer he or she gives. The amount will be specified in the
instructions.”}
We are going to explain the general rules for the experiment in a moment.
We now ask you to please switch off your mobile phones. We also ask you
not to talk to each other during the experiment. If you have a question, raise
your hand and we will come to answer. Are there any questions?
If there are no questions, we can start. You will see some instructions on
your screen. Read them carefully before clicking on ”next” to proceed to the
following screen. If you see the sentence ”Waiting for other players” on your
screen, it means that everyone must click on ”next” before the next screen
appears. If you have a question during the experiment, raise your hand.
General instructions:
We are now going to explain the general rules for this experiment. They
will be followed by specific instructions.
Your answers during this experiment will have no consequence for other
participants, and their answers will have no consequence for you. It is impor-
tant for you to know that your answers will remain completely anonymous.
If you have any questions, raise your hand. If there are no questions, we can
give you the specific instructions.
Specific instructions:
You will now be given 27 questions from a Raven test. You will have
roughly 30 minutes to answer the 27 questions (more precisely, 66 seconds
for each question). Each time, you will see a 3*3 matrix of abstract figures.
The third cell in the third line of the matrix will be empty, and you will be
asked to select the corresponding figure from a set. We will show you an
example before starting the test. At the end, you will see a screen saying
”End of the 27 questions”, before proceeding to the following screen.
{In treatments with a piece rate, the following sentence was included here:
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”IMPORTANT : you will receive one cent (in treatment 3, one euro) for each
correct answer”. In treatment 4, the following sentence was included instead:
”Before showing you the example and starting the test, we ask you to choose
one of the following options:
OPTION 1: I wish to receive one cent for each correct answer (in addition
to the 15 euros for participating in the experiment)
OPTION 2: I do not wish to receive one cent for each correct answer (in
addition to the 15 euros for participating in the experiment).”}
Here is an example. You should choose from the set of eight figures below
the one that corresponds to the third cell in the third line of the matrix.
Here the correct answer is ”5”.
If you have any question, raise your hand.
Click on ”Next” to begin the 27 questions.
{Test}
End of the 27 questions.
Now everyone has completed the Raven test. You are asked to guess the
number of correct answers you have given, and the average number of correct
answers given in your group. {Each treatment here specified the payment rule
for correct guesses: one euro per correct guess in treatments 1, 2 and 4; three
euros for two correct guesses in treatment 3; ten euros per correct guess in
treatment 5}
{Results screen}
The experiment has ended. We now ask you to answer the following
questionnaire.
6.2 Instructions for the second experiment
Welcome; you are about to participate in an economics experiment. Your
answers and decisions during this experiment will have no consequence for
your grades or your degree. This experiment studies decision-making. There
are no right or wrong decisions - you should simply decide according to your
preferences.
The experiment will be remunerated. The amount will depend on your
decisions and those of the other participants.
We are going to explain the rules for the experiment in a moment. We
now ask you to please switch off your mobile phones. We also ask you not to
talk to each other during the experiment. If you have a question, raise your
hand and we will come to answer. Are there any questions?
If there are no questions, we can start. You will see some instructions on
your screen. Read them carefully before clicking on ”next” to proceed to the
following screen. If you see the sentence ”Waiting for other players” on your
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screen, it means that everyone must click on ”next” before the next screen
appears. If you have a question during the experiment, raise your hand.
General instructions:
We are now going to explain the general rules for this experiment. They
will be followed by specific instructions.
During this experiment you will sometimes be asked to take decisions that
will have consequences for you and for other participants. It is important for
you to know that your decisions will remain completely anonymous.
Each individual will be assigned to a group of three, using the ID code you
selected at the beginning. You will never know who were the other members
of your group, and they will never know that you were in their group. In
each group of three, there will be a participant ”A”, a participant ”B”, and
a participant ”C”. Each individual will learn his role (A, B or C) shortly.
When referring to other members of your group, we will always use their
letter (A, B or C) and never their ID code or other information that might
allow you to identify them.
If you have any questions, raise your hand. If there are no questions, we
can give you the specific instructions.
Specific instructions:
In this experiment, each participant will answer 12 questions from a Raven
test (similar to the one used in the last experiment, but not the same).
In each group of three, ”A” will receive 1 Euro per correct answer given
by ”B”. ”B” will receive 1 Euro per correct answer given by ”C”. ”C” will
receive 1 Euro per correct answer given by ”A”.
Before starting the test, ”A” has to choose the amount he will pay ”B” for
each correct answer given by ”B”. Similarly ”B” has to choose the amount he
will pay ”C” for each correct answer given by ”C”, and ”C” has to choose the
amount he will pay ”A” for each correct answer given by ”A”. The chosen
amounts will be communicated to the receivers before starting the test.
Example: ”A” chooses 50 cents, this amount is communicated to ”B”;
”B” chooses 40 cents, this amount is communicated to ”C”; ”C” chooses 30
cents, this amount is communicated to ”A”. In this case, ”A” knows that he
will receive 50 cents per correct answer given by ”B” (1 Euro minus the 50
cents he has chosen to pay ”B”). He also knows he will receive 30 cents from
”C” for each correct answer he will give himself.
{Each subject then receives the instructions corresponding to his role. To
save space we report those for ”A”; the ones for ”B” and ”C” are identical
except for the letters}
You are the ”A” member of the group. You will shortly be asked to choose
the amount X that you will give to ”B” for each correct answer. You will
then receive 1 Euro minus X for each correct answer given by ”B”. You will
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be asked to specify your choice under several possible hypotheses concerning
”B”; we will use the choice corresponding to the correct hypothesis.
Reminder: this choice will be communicated to ”B” before starting the
test.
Important: all participants in today’s experiment also participated in
the last experiment. In that experiment, each participant answered the same
27 questions from a Raven test, under the same time constraint (maximum
66 seconds for each question). However, some aspects of the experiment were
not the same in each session. We will give you more information about these
shortly, in the form of ten hypotheses, before asking you each time to specify
your choice. Take the time you need to read carefully each hypothesis.
{The ten hypotheses are presented two at a time on the screen, with de-
cisions being taken on each screen before proceeding to the following}
{Screen 1}: In the last experiment, ”B” participated in a session where
the instructions specified: ”During the experiment, you will be asked first of
all to answer some questions from a Raven test. This is a test that is often
used to test IQ (intelligence quotient). The experiment will last approxi-
mately 40 minutes. Each participant will receive 15 euros for his participa-
tion.” Concerning the Raven test, the instructions specified: ”You will have
roughly 30 minutes to answer the 27 questions (more precisely, 66 seconds
for each question). At the end of the experiment, you will see on your screen
the number of correct answers you gave, and the average number of correct
answers in your group”.
Before starting the test, each participant had to decide whether he wished
to receive 1 cent per correct answer on the Raven test or not.
Hypothesis 1: ”B” decided not to receive 1 cent per correct answer.
Hypothesis 2: ”B” decided to receive 1 cent per correct answer.
{Screen 2}: In the last experiment, ”B” participated in a session where
the instructions specified: ”During the experiment, you will be asked first of
all to answer some questions from a Raven test. This is a test that is often
used to test IQ (intelligence quotient). The experiment will last approxi-
mately 40 minutes. Each participant will receive 15 euros for his participa-
tion.” Concerning the Raven test, the instructions specified: ”You will have
roughly 30 minutes to answer the 27 questions (more precisely, 66 seconds
for each question).” The instructions did not specify that at the end each
participant would learn the number of correct answers he had given, and the
average number of correct answers in his group.
Before starting the test, each participant had to decide whether he wished
to receive 1 cent per correct answer on the Raven test or not.
Hypothesis 3: ”B” decided not to receive 1 cent per correct answer.
Hypothesis 4: ”B” decided to receive 1 cent per correct answer.
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{Screen 3}: In the last experiment, ”B” participated in a session where
the instructions specified: ”During the experiment, you will be asked first of
all to answer some questions from a Raven test. This is a test that is often
used to test IQ (intelligence quotient). The experiment will last approxi-
mately 40 minutes. Each participant will receive 15 euros for his participa-
tion.” Concerning the Raven test, the instructions specified: ”You will have
roughly 30 minutes to answer the 27 questions (more precisely, 66 seconds
for each question).” The instructions did not specify that at the end each
participant would learn the number of correct answers he had given, and the
average number of correct answers in his group.
Hypothesis 5: There was no mention of a payment per correct answer
(beyond the 15 euros for participating in the experiment). The number of
correct answers given by ”B” was greater than or equal to 18.
Hypothesis 6: The instructions specified that 1 cent would be paid for
each correct answer (beyond the 15 euros for participating in the experiment).
The number of correct answers given by ”B” was greater than or equal to
18.
{Screen 4}: In the last experiment, ”B” participated in a session where
the instructions specified: ”During the experiment, you will be asked first of
all to answer some questions from a Raven test. This is a test that is often
used to test IQ (intelligence quotient). The experiment will last approxi-
mately 40 minutes. Each participant will receive 15 euros for his participa-
tion.” Concerning the Raven test, the instructions specified: ”You will have
roughly 30 minutes to answer the 27 questions (more precisely, 66 seconds
for each question).” The instructions did not specify that at the end each
participant would learn the number of correct answers he had given, and the
average number of correct answers in his group.
Hypothesis 7: There was no mention of a payment per correct answer
(beyond the 15 euros for participating in the experiment). The number of
correct answers given by ”B” was less than 18.
Hypothesis 8: The instructions specified that 1 cent would be paid for
each correct answer (beyond the 15 euros for participating in the experiment).
The number of correct answers given by ”B” was less than 18.
{Screen 5}: In the last experiment, ”B” participated in a session where
the instructions specified: ”During the experiment, you will be asked first of
all to answer some questions from a Raven test. This is a test that is often
used to test IQ (intelligence quotient). The experiment will last approxi-
mately 40 minutes.” Concerning the Raven test, the instructions specified:
”You will have roughly 30 minutes to answer the 27 questions (more pre-
cisely, 66 seconds for each question).” The instructions did not specify that
at the end each participant would learn the number of correct answers he
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had given, and the average number of correct answers in his group. Concern-
ing payment, the instructions specified that 1 cent would be paid for each
correct answer. There was no mention of any payment for participating in
the experiment.
Hypothesis 9: The number of correct answers given by ”B” was greater
than or equal to 18.
Hypothesis 10: The number of correct answers given by ”B” was less
than 18.
{After making all ten choices, ”A” saw the following instructions (B and
C saw identical ones except for the letters)}
”C” has decided to give you ??? cents for each correct answer you give
to the 12 questions in the test. For each question you will have maximum 66
seconds to answer. Click on ”Next” to start the test.
{Test}
You chose to pay ??? cents per correct answer given by ”B”. How many
correct answers do you think ”B” has given? You will receive an additional
euro if your answer is correct.
{Results screen}
The experiment has ended. We now ask you to answer the following
questionnaire.
6.3 Further results: robustness
As noted in section 3, we repeated the analysis of effort in the first experiment
excluding all the subjects who had reached the 66 second timeout on at least
one occasion during the test (24 in total, leaving us with 254 participants).
The results, analogous to those presented in section 3 for the full sample of
278 subjects, are presented below.
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Table 7: Second Experiment: Principals’ piece rate offers
Treatment Agent’s score in first test Mean offer (cents)
1 score>18 14.679
1 score<18 13.062
2 score>18 15.691
2 score<18 12.593
5 score>18 16.272
5 score<18 13.617
Agent chose one-cent piece rate: mean offer is 14.482
Agent rejected one-cent piece rate: mean offer is 16.605
Table 8: First experiment: time to complete IQ test (Raven27), excluding
subjects who reached the timeout at least once during the test
Completion time Mean Observations
treatment1 968.32 44
treatment2 967.00 34
treatment 3 1089.41 99
treatment4 one cent 1020.24 38
treatment4 no cent 1002.86 7
treatment 5 1098.60 32
Pairwise MW tests p-value
treatment 1 versus 3 0.0002∗∗∗
treatment 1 versus 5 0.0006∗∗∗
treatment 2 versus 4 one cent: p=0.313
treatment 1 versus 2: p=0.936
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Table 9: Tobit regression for IQ test completion time (Raven27), excluding
subjects who reached the timeout at least once during the test
Variable Coefficient p-value
treatment2 7.240 0.883
treatment3 145.623∗∗∗ 0.000
treatment4 one cent -3.508 0.969
treatment4 no cent 63.001 0.191
treatment 5 135.415∗∗∗ 0.008
female -22.997 0.404
graduate -66.678∗∗ 0.048
age 13.779∗∗ 0.014
Observations: 254
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